The prodrome of several potential bioterrorism diseases will likely present as influenzalike illness. In a bioterrorism event, the window of opportunity for initiating effective postexposure prophylaxis is short. Real-time, syndrome-based surveillance mechanisms are needed. HealthPartners Medical Group (HPMG) delivers primary care to 240,000 persons in the Minneapolis/St. Paul metropolitan area in Minnesota. Patient encounter data, including International Classification of Diseases, 9th Revision (ICD-9) codes are entered rapidly into their database. Nonidentifying demographic and ICD-9 data are sent to the Minnesota Department of Health (MDH) after posting to an HPMG database. Data are automatically extracted daily and sent to a secure MDH server. Data are appended to 3 years of HPMG ICD-9 count data and analyzed using an outbreak detection algorithm designed specifically by MDH for bioterrorism surveillance. The algorithm normalizes the data using a regression model adjusted for day of the week, season, holidays, and autocorrelation. Cumulative sum (CUSUM) analysis of the predictive residuals is used to detect unexpected ICD-9 count increases. The detection system triggers an "alarm" if the daily ICD-9 count exceeds a threshold. The HPMG ICD-9 data set was independently validated by comparison with historical metropolitan area influenza and pneumonia deaths. The regression model adequately controlled for ICD-9 variability associated with weekend counts and seasonal influenzalike illness fluctuations. The system detected an influenza A outbreak that began in December 2000. When the system was "spiked" with data from a 1979 inhalation anthrax outbreak, it rapidly triggered an alarm. Detection of a bioterrorism event is possible, and real-time syndromic surveillance is achievable using existing data sets. This system was developed quickly and inexpensively. 
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Use of an Electronic Emergency Department Information System as a Data Source for Respiratory Syndrome Surveillance

Oregon Department of Human Services Office of Disease Prevention and Epidemiology
Emergency department (ED) syndromic surveillance may provide early warning of outbreaks due to bioterrorism or natural phenomena. We explored adapting an electronic ED information system (EmSTAT) for use as a data source for respiratory syndrome surveillance. After examining the flow of data in the system, we selected a subset of data elements with potential epidemiological value and evaluated the elements for completeness and validity. Diagnosis codes, disposition, and demographic data were relatively complete; additional clinical data were less reliably recorded. Chief complaint codes were insensitive indicators of visits for respiratory syndromes; however, diagnosis codes correlated well with clinical data. A descriptive analysis of ED visits for respiratory syndromes was possible using diagnosis codes to define syndromes. Encrypted data were transmitted every 4 hours to the health department without added work for ED personnel. Adaptation of existing ED information systems such as this can provide rapid, reliable data for syndromic surveillance.
Partial Evaluation of a Drop-in Bioterrorism Surveillance System in Phoenix, Arizona
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The Maricopa County Department of Public Health (MCDPH), Arizona Department of Health Services, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention implemented a drop-in syndrome surveillance system in 11 hospitals in Phoenix, Arizona, in October/November 2001. The system captured 83% of all 37,157 patients entering the emergency departments, and 83% of these had syndrome information completed. This evaluation of the surveillance system has two components: (1) 33 interviews among participating hospital staff to determine acceptance of the system and (2) a comparison of entered data to paper forms to determine data entry quality. Findings from the data entry analysis showed that 22% of the 3,175 entries analyzed had at least one variable missing or entered incorrectly. Error rates for individual variables ranged from 1.3% to 13.4%. In hospital staff interviews, both positive and negative aspects of the system were mentioned. Positives of the system included willingness to participate again, heightened awareness of bioterrorism, ability to generate instant reports, and improved relationship between health departments and hospitals. Negatives mentioned by staff were that the system slowed the emergency department flow and was labor intensive; medical staff were not compliant; the syndrome checklist did not provide appropriate selections; paper forms were lost, incomplete, or skipped for some patients; and there were problems with the data entry system. We recommend more training for health care providers, incorporating the surveillance system into the existing routine ED electronic system (to reduce paperwork and increase compliance), providing better definitions of syndromes, and maintaining relationships between hospitals and health departments.
New Hampshire Emergency Department Syndromic Surveillance System
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In response to the terrorist attacks in 2001, the Bureau of Communicable Disease Surveillance (BCDS) in New Hampshire initiated emergency department (ED)-based syndromic surveillance in 16 sentinel hospitals based on geographic location and daily census. This sample covers 59% of the state's total ED visits. The syndromic categories collected include fever, respiratory conditions, gastrointestinal illness, and rashes. It is believed that monitoring these syndromes allows for detection during the early phase of a disease outbreak, either natural or resulting from bioterrorism. Participating hospitals send data by fax, phone, or email; however, a pilot project for Web-based data entry is in process. Data are manually
